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Misconduct resistance: The management of restricted drugs in the Western Australian 
public health service 
 
Abstract 
We employ institutional theory to develop and present a framework – involving institutional 
drivers, organisational reactions, and outcomes – to examine and further understand 
misconduct resistance in public sector organisations.  This framework is applied to an 
examination of efforts in the Western Australian public health service to prevent misconduct 
in the management of restricted drugs.  We begin by clarifying a definition of misconduct 
resistance and then synthesise the extant literature develop a typology and framework of 
corruption resistance.  The second part of the paper is a study in which the framework is 
applied to an examination of why and how the Western Australian public health service has 
endeavoured to prevent misconduct in the management of restricted drugs.  Top-down 
imposition of regulations rather than shifts in individual employee attitudes is found.  The 
paper concludes by outlining the potential contributions to theory and practice in approaches 
to increasing misconduct resistance in public health care organisations.  
   
Word count: 6000 
 
Track: Public Management and Governance (Managing Health Care) 
 
 2 
Introduction 
Public sector organisations that are able to resist misconduct are desirable and necessary to 
ensure the effective delivery of public services and maintain public confidence in the 
workings of government.  There are number of contemporary challenges in misconduct 
resistance research relating to the development of theorisations that can be applied to a range 
of situations and contexts, conceptualising it as an on-going process, and creating systems 
that go beyond a simple checklist approach (Menzel, 2007).  To date, progress has been 
hampered due to the elusiveness of a definition of misconduct resistance and inconsistent use 
of the term.  Indeed ‘misconduct’ has been used interchangeably with other terms such as 
‘unethical behaviour’ and ‘corruption’.  Using such broad terms can be problematic if they 
are not clearly delineated.  For example, it is important to separate deviant behaviour 
(breaking organisational policies and procedures) from behaviour that is illegal (breaking 
civil or criminal law).  The former may be termed unethical but not illegal (misconduct) 
while the latter is both unethical and illegal (serious misconduct/unlawful/corrupt behaviour) 
(e.g., Gottschalk, 2012; Newburn, 1999).  This may be illustrated by contrasting two 
definitions.  The first is ‘when public officials … use their position and power to benefit 
themselves and others close to them’ (Vian, 2007, p.84) and the second is ‘the pursuit of 
individual interests by one or more organisational actors through the intentional misdirection 
of organisational resources or perversion of organisational routines’ (Lange, 2009, p.710).  
The first definition refers to serious misconduct or corruption as it involves (illegal) abuse of 
power for personal gain.  The second refers to a broader set of behaviours that range from 
misconduct through to illegality and corruption. 
 
An effective framework for examining misconduct resistance needs to be integrative in 
several ways.  First, the framework requires a definition of misconduct resistance that is 
broader than that which is seen in the extant literature, and it must draw on and synthesise 
knowledge and concepts from existing theory.  This will make the framework potentially 
valuable and relevant to public sector administration researchers and practitioners. This 
enables researchers to examine misconduct resistance systems as a whole or to focus on its 
various components and/or elements.  Finally, it should organise a range of relevant variables 
into a multi-level framework, enabling further analysis of internal dynamics and causal 
pathways.  Together, these attributes will allow for the broad application of the framework 
across sectors, contexts, issues and time. 
 
Our survey of the literature revealed that misconduct resistance is relatively under-researched   
and under-theorised.  The area of police research is one notable exception.  Studies indicate 
that strategies employed by law enforcement agencies fall into two broad categories: 
organisational strategies (e.g., organisational culture, policies, leadership, limiting 
opportunities, and investigation/consequences), and social strategies (e.g., social culture, 
colleague influence and external influence (Porter and Prenzler, 2012).  We draw on this area 
of research to define misconduct as referring to an array of behaviours ranging from criminal 
corrupt behaviour, to process corruption, neglect of duties, nepotism, cronyism, bullying and 
intimidation, and abuses of privilege or power (Prenzler, 2009). 
 
 
Misconduct and restricted drugs 
In the area of public health, misconduct associated with pharmaceuticals is a major global 
health issue resulting in negative impacts on patient care, lost resources and an erosion of 
public confidence (World Health Organisation, 2009).  Such misconduct takes the form of 
theft (for personal use) or diversion (for resale) of drugs and can occur at various points 
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including delivery, storage, distribution, and use (Vian, 2007).  Undertaking research in this 
area is important because vulnerability to misconduct carries with it risks of misdirection of 
scarce public resources, the impeding of governments and public sector agencies from 
pursuing their objectives, and the creation of waste and inefficiency.  Developing systems 
that are resistant to such misconduct is therefore necessary to protect the effectiveness of the 
public health sector.   
 
Misconduct resistance has become of increased interest in the public administration literature 
but its definition and use remains uncertain and inconsistent.  Moreover, the variation in the 
scope and scale of perspectives on misconduct resistance limits the ability of researchers to 
develop and test theory.  Using an illustrative case example of controlled drug management 
in the Western Australian (WA) public health sector, the aim of this paper is to address some 
of these conceptual limitations associated with the study of misconduct resistance.  This 
paper contributes by synthesising and expanding existing theory and research into an 
integrative framework for researching, practicing and evaluating misconduct resistance. 
 
In this paper a definition of misconduct resistance is outlined and an exploration of its scope 
and origins in the literature is presented.  A framework for misconduct resistance is then 
explained and illustrated by applying it to a critical examination of the management of 
restricted drugs in WA hospitals.  The article concludes with a discussion about the 
implications of the framework for the management of controlled drugs in the WA public 
health sector specifically and for public administration theory, research and practice more 
broadly. 
 
 
Defining misconduct resistance 
Existing definitions of misconduct resistance tend to focus on controlling and minimising 
misconduct through managing the problem by for example, ‘effective managerial control’ 
being exercised in an organisation (Lange, 2009), or enhancing the ability of an organisation 
to identify its misconduct risk profile and implement effective responses to minimise this risk 
(Gorta, 2006), or by increasing the capacity of organisations and individuals to ‘resist ethical 
spoilage’ (Kish-Gephart, Harrison and Trevino, 2010, p. 23).  Other approaches allude to 
agency and structural dimensions in discussing the prevention and control of misconduct 
(e.g., Mulgan and Wanna, 2011) and how it connects to the development of integrity as ‘the 
application of values, principles and norms in the daily operations of public sector’ involving 
behavioural change as well as organisational reform as ‘a relative, evolving and culturally 
defined aspiration’ (Evans, 2012, p. 97/98).  As such, integrity can be seen as a key element 
in misconduct resistance as it enables the establishing of ‘an ethical consciousness in [an] 
organisation and in the relationships [employees have] with members of other organisations, 
private and public’ (Menzel, 2006, p. 190) and ensuring ‘wholeness (stressing consistency) 
… exemplary moral behaviour [and] the quality of acting in accordance with laws and codes’ 
(Huberts and Six, 2012, p. 159).  Taking this close connection into account, we define 
misconduct resistance as, ‘the capacity of an organisation to develop and maintain its 
integrity’. 
 
In this paper, institutional theory is employed to develop the above definition of misconduct 
resistance by re-casting the OECD (1998) principles of public sector ethics and Menzel’s 
(2006) two-by-two model of integrity/compliance.  While the ideas presented by the OECD 
(1998) and Menzel (2006) are used to assess nations, the typology we develop is applicable 
to individual public sector agencies and organisations.  We conceptualise misconduct 
 4 
resistance as having two main moments: one that arises from external forces (structure) and 
the other from action by and within organisations (agency).  Together, these forces firstly act 
on organisations in ways that drive conformity to sets of external (structural) codified moral 
principles (e.g., honesty, fairness, justice, trust) by which organisations and their employees 
demonstrably stand.  The second propels consistent agency by which organisations retain a 
state of internal connectedness and wholeness.  The two elements of structure and agency 
included in this definition can be used as axes around which a two-by-two typology of 
misconduct resistance is constructed (Figure 1). 
 
 
 
Figure 1 A Typology of Misconduct Resistance  
 
In Quadrant One the situation is of low agency and low structure influence.  In this case an 
organisation has neither the external policy/regulatory/monitoring framework to support its 
operation or the internal capacity to take action to prevent misconduct.  As a result the 
organisation is in a state of directionless ‘drift’ and vulnerable to malfeasant actions of 
individuals or networks of individuals.  Quadrant Two refers to a situation of high agency 
and low structure that we call ‘Laissez Faire’ in which the capacity to resist misconduct 
within the organisation is unsustainable.  This is because this type of organisation is unstable 
as it depends only on its own capabilities to resist misconduct with no external support or 
framework.  Quadrant Three is a situation of high structure and low agency.  For these 
organisations there is only capacity to comply with external regulation.  We argue that this 
leads to compliance or ‘shallow resistance’ in which there is a tendency to adopt an 
insufficient lowest common denominator approach (Menzel, 2006).  In this situation, low-
level misconduct is likely to go unchecked.  Quadrant Four is where there is both high agency 
and high structure influences at work.  In such an organisation not only are there structures at 
work that foster and support misconduct resistance, organisations have created their own 
capacity to resist misconduct within these structures.  We argue that this is where internal and 
external influences are in alignment and misconduct resistance is at its highest and most 
sustainable. 
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An integrative framework of misconduct resistance 
To expand the typology of misconduct resistance into a framework for analysis, institutional 
theory is further applied.  To achieve this, a broad array of literature needs to be explored and 
synthesised.  Institutional theory draws attention to the environment as a socially constructed 
context of action that shapes decisions made within organisations (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983; Heugens and Lander, 2009; Scott, 1995) and provides a way of conceptualising public 
sector organisations as nested systems of individuals, organisations, and political and social 
structures (Shadnam and Lawrence, 2011).  A breakdown in these systems can leave an 
organisation vulnerable to moral collapse allowing misconduct to flourish unchecked 
(Shadnam and Lawrence, 2011).   
 
When structure is considered as being a primary influence on public sector organisations they 
will tend to conform to similar patterns of performance and practice.  This is due to 
isomorphic pressures arising from the external environment.  DiMaggio and Powell (1983) 
identify these pressures coming in the form of coercion (e.g., regulation), mimesis (copying 
practices from successful counterparts), and social norms (e.g., accreditation).  While 
isomorphic pressure would be considered beneficial in terms of improved organisational 
performance – desirable in the realm of misconduct resistance in the public sector – similarity 
also implies a reduction in variation in policies and structures among organisations which 
could in turn lead to a reduction in an ability to improvise and respond effectively to change 
thus increasing vulnerability to external shock (Heugens and Lander, 2009). 
 
Institutional theory though also includes the idea that such potential vulnerabilities caused by 
isomorphism leads organisations to respond by developing new behaviours and practices that 
differentiate them from their counterparts creating variability rather than similarity (Heugens 
and Lander, 2009).  In this respect structures form the basis for organisations to develop 
autonomous behaviours and thus change and variability (Dacin, Goodstein, and Scott, 2002). 
 
The structural perspective on misconduct resistance in the public sector then is about 
reducing the presence of misconduct through isomorphic pressure.  An example of these 
pressures may be found in the work of Hood and Peters (2004).  They argue that public sector 
organisations prefer process and compliance oriented approaches such as procurement rules, 
external audit, and surveillance systems that would prevent misconduct through removing 
opportunity and deter through increasing chances of detection.  These are generally standard 
administrative processes adopted across public sector organisations within a particular 
jurisdiction.  Evidence that such isomorphic pressures lead to conformity is quite strong.  
Public sector organisations are liable to such pressure to the extent that external influences 
rival internal controls (Frumkin and Galaskiewicz, 2004).  It is important though to 
distinguish the outcomes of external (structural) influences between compliance (direction of 
movement) and convergence (resemblance) because the former is more significant than the 
latter (Ashworth, Boyne, and Delbridge, 2009).  When applied to misconduct resistance, 
these institutional perspectives focus attention on the main problematic of preventing 
misconduct through effective public sector-wide external measures that encourage 
compliance and convergence to a set of standards and behaviours. 
 
That convergence is a somewhat weaker influence than compliance suggests that while 
public sector organisations are subject to isomorphic pressures, this does not necessarily lead 
to an outcome of resemblance (Ashworth et al., 2009).  Institutional theory also leads us to 
consider that organisations display autonomous behaviours.  It is possible to argue that it is 
not just structure that determines behaviours within the public sector but also agency.  This 
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brings into focus the interplay between enduring belief systems of organisations that serve as 
templates for thought and action, recurring patterns of behaviour based on organisational 
structures and logics, and the actions of people as they themselves understand them (Wry, 
2009).  Together these form frameworks that people draw on to justify their practices.  
Taking agency into account, understanding misconduct resistance depends on taking into 
account influences such as organisational leadership and the relationship between employees 
and their organisations.  To understand how these dimensions and components combine to 
influence misconduct resistance, a framework is developed as detailed below. 
 
The structure of the misconduct resistance framework includes three related components: 
drivers, reactions, and outcomes.  Our framework incorporates other frameworks and 
research but configures them in a way that suggests causal relationships among the 
components and elements (Figure 2).  
 
 
Figure 2 A Framework for Misconduct Resistance 
 
The first box is composed of institutional drivers (structure and agency) representing the 
range of external influences that constrain public sector organisations and the influences 
internal to organisations that run – to varying extents – counter to external constraints.  These 
institutional drivers generate two organisational reactions as depicted in the second box.  
These are conformity (becoming more similar to other organisations) and differentiation 
(becoming at variance with other organisations).  From the interplay of organisational 
reactions emerge those elements shown in the third box relating to outcomes.  In this part of 
the model attention is paid to organisational outcomes (e.g. culture), systems and process 
outcomes (e.g., policies and practices), and people outcomes (e.g., employee well-being).  
Together, these outcomes have potential external impacts (i.e., results relating to broader 
community concerns) that in turn have implications for capacity building for misconduct 
resistance (i.e., trending towards ‘alignment’ as detailed in Figure 1). 
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The structure of the corruption resistance framework includes three related components.  
Specific elements within these components are listed in Table 1 and described in more detail 
in the following sections. 
 
Table 1 A Framework Model of Corruption Resistance 
 
Institutional Drivers 
Structure 
Institutional Drivers 
Agency 
Dimensions 
and 
Components 
Coercive Forces 
Mimetic 
Forces 
Normative Forces Adaptation 
Employee 
Characteristics 
Elements 
within 
Components 
− Anti-
corruption 
agencies 
− Regulation 
and 
Legislation 
− Risk 
management 
− Audit 
 
− Model 
integrity 
systems 
− E-
government 
− Governance 
Standards 
− Professional 
standards 
− Accountability 
and 
Transparency 
− Ethics training 
 
− Consequence 
systems 
− Control systems 
− Leadership/ 
Management 
− Communication 
− Demographic 
− Psych. 
contracts  
− Level in 
organisation 
− Routines 
− Motivation 
 
 
Table 1 Continued 
Organisational 
Reactions Outcomes External Impacts  
Conformity vs 
Differentiation 
Organisational 
environment 
Systems and 
processes People  
− Public trust 
 
Capacity Building 
− Compliance 
− Convergence 
− Entrepreneurship 
 
− Networks 
− Social trap 
− Ethical 
climate 
− Ethical 
culture 
− Codes of 
conduct 
− Organisational 
design 
− Human 
Resource 
Management 
 
 
− Level of 
ambiguity 
− Level of 
uncertainty 
− Duty 
− Fairness 
− Well-being 
Aim will be to improve 
misconduct resistance 
(See Figure 2). 
 
 
Institutional drivers (structure) 
Coercive forces arise from external sources.  One of the most researched coercive influences 
in the misconduct resistance area is the Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA).  Research evidence 
suggests that over the past two decades the ACA has grown to become an important 
structural force (de Sousa 2010).  This is not least because of the numerous cases of 
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misconduct and corruption they have exposed (Prenzler and Faulkner, 2010) and their 
activities as key proactive organisations for ensuring public sector integrity (Evans, 2012).  
While the coercive power of ACAs arises from their legally enshrined independent 
investigative and prosecutorial functions, they also have broader roles in leadership and 
standard-setting responsibilities for misconduct resistance (Head, 2012). 
   
Mimesis or the tendency to imitate is evident in public sector organisations in that they tend 
to look towards and emulate others that are seen as being more successful (Frumkin and 
Galaskiewicz, 2004).  This means that mimetic pressures that come to bear on public sector 
organisation tend to arise from within the public sector itself. 
 
Normative forces tend to arise from actors that are related to but outside the particular field in 
which organisations operate.  For example standards set by national or international 
professional bodies tend to be adopted more or less uniformly across a jurisdiction.  The 
presence of such professional norms tends to move public sector managers towards making 
decisions that shift their organisation towards similarity with other public sector organisations 
(Frumkin and Galaskiewicz, 2004).  One particular example is the adoption of accountability 
and transparency norms as a mechanism for promoting wide acceptance of misconduct 
resistance.  Research suggests that a key enabler of this is the implementation of Information 
and Communications Technology (ICT) and developments in e-government (which 
themselves have international technological standards).  Through their application increases 
in accountability can be achieved as citizens come to expect a more transparent public sector 
thus creating new standards of misconduct resistance (Andersen, 2009; Kim et al., 2009).  
ICT is a key supporting/facilitating technology in the promotion of a culture of transparency 
and open access government that together increases misconduct resistance of public sector 
organisations provided a culture of transparency is embedded within the governance system 
(Bertot, Jaeger, and Grimes, 2010).   
 
 
Institutional drivers (agency) 
Adaptation is defined as a tendency of organisations to continuously reconfigure their 
composition, plans, polices and practices in response to and in anticipation of shifts in the 
environment in which they operate (North, 1995) and/or to transform the situation or issue 
itself (Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh, 2011).  In the case of responding to the environment 
there are a number of ways that organisations adapt.  Public sector managers have an 
important role in developing and implementing policies and procedures, and fostering 
positive employee orientations to misconduct resistance (Lee et al., 2011).  There are though 
four mechanisms that managers can deploy: limiting employee freedom of action, 
consequence/reward systems to deter corrupt conduct, interpretation and transmission of 
external requirements to employees, and fostering employee orientation towards resisting 
corrupt behaviour (Lange, 2009).   
 
Employee characteristics and how they interact with management are important 
considerations in affecting the agency dimension of an organisation’s ability to resist 
misconduct.  Taking employee characteristics into account means accepting the notion that 
relying simply on trying to ensure employee compliance with organisational policies and 
procedures is not sufficient.  This is because it ‘takes power relations for granted … rather 
than understanding them as crucial to the process of making sense of rules and situated 
contexts’ (Gordon, Clegg, and Kronberger, 2009, p. 94). 
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As the previous sections suggest structural factors or agency factors alone are not adequate 
for ensuring misconduct resistance.  Integrity is not just about adhering to self-defined values 
and principles (Dacin, et al., 2002) (agency), it is also about ‘the application of [widely 
accepted] values, principles and norms in the daily operations of public sector organisations’ 
(Evans, 2012, p. 97) (structure).  This includes: work-plan integration, risk mitigation, 
effective monitoring, ethical behaviours, compliance, audit, and capabilities (training, 
learning, mentoring, coaching) (Evans, 2012) that suggest effects of structure and agency.  
Evans (2012) also points out though that there is a problem of an integrity paradox evident in 
the existence of gaps between the aims of polices designed to improve public sector integrity 
and the absorption of the norms and values implied in the reforms by individual 
organisations.  In particular there is a tendency to focus on compliance behaviour rather than 
inculcating integrity values amongst employees. 
 
Organisational reactions  
One of the central themes of institutional theory is that the influence of structure leads 
organisations to conform to a set of broadly accepted rules or standards.  On the other hand, 
the influence of agency leads to differentiation in that organisations become more diverse.  
This depends on the relative strength of institutional drivers.  Conformity and differentiation 
are valued in the public sector, for example in higher education (Rabovsky, 2012).  There is 
though debate about what each of these mean.  Some argue that institutional theory is vague 
about the meaning of conformity (Frumkin and Galaskiewicz, 2004).  Others though respond 
to this challenge by identifying ‘compliance’ (movement towards similarity) and 
‘convergence’ (a state of resemblance) as being two dimensions of conformity (Ashworth et 
al., 2009).   
 
With regard to differentiation, agency theorists refute the idea that organisations are 
unconstrained (Heugens and Lander, 2006) arguing instead that they are capable being 
different to other organisations as a response to institutional pressures (Dacin, et al., 2002).  
For example an organisation can display a degree of entrepreneurship marking them out as 
being somewhat different (Battilana, Leca and Roxenbaum, 2009).  It can be argued then that 
within an institutional framework, conformity is a product of structure while differentiation is 
a product of agency.  As such it is possible to develop components to assess how 
organisations are reacting to structure and agency by examining structure, culture and 
strategy (Ashworth, et al., 2009).   
 
Outcomes 
In our framework, we focus on outcomes that can be discerned in the organisational 
environment, systems and processes, and employees (people).  There is evidence that an 
improved organisational environment is an outcome of enhanced misconduct resistance. The 
key areas are: ethical climate and culture (Kish-Gephart, et al., 2010) and networks 
(Warburton, 2001).  Ethical climate and culture are predictors of conduct (Pinto et al., 2008). 
Improvements in these should accompany enhanced misconduct resistance, in particular, the 
shift from a culture of mistrust to one of trust (Pelletier and Bligh, 2006).  Connected to 
climate and culture is the role of networks in that they are the means by which ethical 
cultures spread.  
  
Systems and processes that control networks and maintain and improve the effectiveness of 
the public sector are a significant outcome of enhanced misconduct resistance.  One of the 
major challenges here is ‘to formulate a model of bureaucracy and policy formulation that 
can integrate the reality of personalised relations and social networks whilst ensuring 
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decisions are always made in the interests of the “the public” alone’ (Warburton, 2001. p. 
235).  Effective misconduct resistance brings with it organisational designs and practices that 
not only inhibit corrupt networks but also encourage misconduct resistant networks (Pinto et 
al., 2008).  A key aspect of this is collaboration throughout an organisation (Porter and 
Prenzler, 2012).  The ultimate outcome of this is that misconduct resistance results from 
systems and processes that create a situation where codes of conduct, ethics training, and 
integrity indicators are an integral part of an organisation’s operations (Huberts and Six, 
2012).  
 
For people who work in public sector organisations, a significant outcome of misconduct 
resistance is reduced ambiguity and uncertainty about what is acceptable and unacceptable 
behaviour.  Improved awareness and intuition coupled with rationalisation, and reasoning 
facilitates the development of effective approaches that minimise uncertainty and prevent 
misconduct (Murphy and Dacin, 2011).  Such uncertainty can be understood by employing 
the concept of ‘liminal space’ (where existing rules are softened) to help understand why 
sometimes it is difficult to separate what is and is not misconduct in organisations (Cunha 
and Cabral-Cardozo, 2006).   
 
External Impacts  
A key impact of misconduct resistance is maintaining public trust.  This is important to the 
effective functioning of the public sector and has thus received a great deal of attention by 
researchers.  Misconduct resistance can be connected to public trust and the overall quality of 
democratic life (Anechiarico, 2010).  This involves public sector organisations ‘getting their 
processes right, treating people fairly, avoiding favouritism and containing misconduct’ (van 
Ryzin, 2011, p. 755).  Maintaining public trust ensures that citizens have confidence in public 
sector organisations and institutions (Salminen and Ikola-Norrbacka, 2011). 
 
 
Controlled drug management in Western Australian hospitals 
In this study, the framework outlined above is applied to critically examine the effects of 
attempts to improve controlled drug management practices in WA hospitals in order to 
minimise misconduct.  It traces the playing out of changes that occurred following an 
investigation by the Corruption and Crime Commission of Western Australia (CCCWA) 
(2010) into the risks of theft and misuse of Schedule 4 drugs (those that have potential for 
abuse) and Schedule 8 drugs (drugs of addiction) in hospitals.   
 
This paper uses data collected from published policy documents and reports produced by the 
WA Health Department and the CCWA relating to the management and control of Schedule 
4 and Schedule 8 drugs.  Supporting information about the practice of administering 
management in hospitals was obtained from a key hospital staff member.  The data collected 
was analysed using qualitative methods to assess the extent to which the framework outlined 
in Figure 2 provided a useful and relevant approach to examining the effectiveness of efforts 
to enhance misconduct resistance.  A thematic data analysis was conducted by firstly 
reflecting on the content of the documents and discussions to achieve an overall sense of the 
data.  Initial codes were developed from the data that referred to the similarities and 
differences between the perspectives provided by the sources.  Categorisations were then 
generated and crosschecked to ensure consistency and authenticity. 
 
The broad context of the study is the WA public sector environment.  The State of WA is 
responsible for the delivery of public health services within the jurisdiction.  However, public 
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health services are partly funded by the Federal Medicare system with the remainder being 
covered by the State Government.  In WA, private health companies also provide public 
hospital services through contracting agreements with the State Government.  
 
Looking at the specific context of controlled drugs, two Acts of Parliament govern their 
management and administration.  These are: The Poisons Act 1964 that defines Schedule 4 
and Schedule 8 drugs (drugs of addiction), and the Misuse of Drugs Act 1981 that created 
two types of ‘specified Schedule 4 drugs’ that while not being addictive, may be open to 
abuse (Division 1, e.g., barbiturates and ephedrine, and Division 2, e.g., androgenic 
substances).  The Acts require hospitals to have systems to control the storage and 
administration of these types of drugs. 
 
In 2003, an Act of Parliament established the CCWA.  It is the major agency involved in the 
investigation and prosecution of cases of official misconduct.  It also has a major role in 
developing misconduct resistance within the WA public sector of which the Health 
Department is one of the largest agencies. 
 
Institutional drivers 
The coercive forces at work in this case begin with laws that delineate the control of 
potentially dangerous and addictive drugs and the institutions that enforce these laws.  In WA 
the primary enforcement agency is the CCCWA but also the Police have a role where there is 
unlawful activity.  In 2010 the Commission undertook an investigation of these systems in 
the major hospitals (Crime and Corruption Commission of Western Australia, 2010).  It was 
found that:  
 
The Commission formed the opinion the Department was not adequately managing the 
misconduct risks associated with the day-to-day management and handling of Schedule 8 and 
Schedule 4 drugs.  
 
No clearly articulated responsibility ownership and direction of misconduct management within 
WA Health.  
 
WA Health is currently unable to adequately account to the wider community for the way it 
manages misconduct risk and related occurrences of misconduct in a demonstrably fair, reliable 
and transparent way. 
 
In their report, the CCCWA (2010, p. xiii) made four recommendations: 
 
That the Department of Health articulate and promote its commitment to managing misconduct 
throughout WA Health. 
 
That the Department of Health, through the Senior Health Executive Forum, identify and commit 
to a strategy for managing misconduct, including a plan to give practical effect to that strategy. 
 
That the Department of Health, through the Senior Executive Health Forum, commit sufficient 
resources to that strategy to make it work. 
 
That the Department of Health work with the Commission to achieve progress. 
 
As a result of this investigation the third coercive force came into play.  In response to the 
CCCWA report, the Health Department of WA issued a directive to all public hospitals and 
private hospitals admitting public patients concerning the reporting of missing Schedule 8 
and ‘Specified’ Schedule 4 drugs.  It also directed that the management of Specified Schedule 
4 drugs conform to a process that included having two staff sign for these drugs when 
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required by a patient and maintain these drugs in separate locked cupboard with a single set 
of keys kept on a separate fob (Government of Western Australia Department of Health, 
2012). This went someway beyond the requirements set down in an earlier directive about the 
management of specified Schedule 4 drugs widening the range and imposing a stricter regime 
(Government of Western Australia Department of Health, 2009).   
 
The actions of the Health Department were designed to coerce hospital staff to conform to a 
particular standardised process.  There is no evidence of mimesis.  Practices in other 
jurisdictions (e.g., UK or USA) did not appear to have been used to inform policy.  There is 
also no evidence that standards from other jurisdictions were consulted (norming).  For 
example, standards for effective drug control are published by the UK National Health 
Service (National Prescribing Centre, 2010) which provide appropriate guidance for 
establishing robust systems that addresses a the range of issues associated with effective drug 
control that corresponds to the model outlined in Figure 2 and Table 1. 
 
This also meant that existing practices of drug management and control were ignored.  
Agency dimensions of misconduct resistance were not recognised by decision makers at the 
WA Health Department.  In particular the need to make sufficient resources available to 
make any interventions work effectively.  The approach was to issue directives and expect 
front-line nurse managers and nursing staff to comply.  
 
While hospital managers were efficient in transmitting Health Department directives to 
medical and nursing staff, there was no room allowed for interpretation to suit particular 
circumstances or changing employee attitudes.  Employee characteristics and how they 
interact with management were not considered in this process and as a result it was simply 
assumed that a rules-based approach would be adequate.  This is an example of relying on 
compliance with organisational policies and procedures rather than also trying to find out 
about and take into account good practices that already existed. 
 
Organisational reactions  
There is evidence of convergence and differentiation between the public and private sector 
organisations within the WA health sector.  When administering of drugs to public patients in 
public and private hospitals adhering to Health Department directives are mandatory.  This 
resulted in convergence of practice across WA hospitals treating public patients.  There is 
though no such requirement on private hospitals treating private patients.  As a result there is 
now clear differentiation between private and public hospitals where there was none before. 
 
Regarding outcomes in organisational environment, systems and processes, and employees 
(people).  The changes had little or no effect on the organisational environment in terms of 
ethical climate or culture other than ensuring compliance with directives.  The main effect 
was on systems and processes in that additional controls and administrative procedures were 
implemented.  This resulted in additional time being taken in the administration of Schedule 
4 drugs.  The outcomes for the people involved (i.e., patients and staff) were significant, for 
example, in the case of pain relief drugs (e.g., Tramadol), patients do not now receive timely 
and adequate pain relief because a previously 1 or 2 minute task undertaken by one nurse 
changed to a 15-minute task requiring two nursing staff.  These additional administrative 
tasks were added without additional resources.  This means more is now required of nurses 
leading to higher stress levels, greater workload, and less time available for other tasks. 
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The external impacts the issue of drug control was not an issue of public concern until the 
CCC undertook their audit.  Then the results were reported in the local press that resulted in 
raised public awareness of the issue but no real concern.  Consequently, public trust was not 
an issue in this case especially given that medial staff and nurses are generally held in high 
esteem and as such there were few, if any, external impacts. 
 
Overall, the approach taken by the WA Health Department to this issue is unlikely to be 
totally successful as it tackles only one aspect of the problems associated with misconduct in 
this area.  This is because the focus has been solely on coercion (top-down) directives while 
missing other key elements in developing misconduct resistance (Table 2).  As a result, 
misconduct resistance with regard to the management of controlled drugs in hospitals will be 
most likely at the level of ‘Compliance’ (Figure 1).  This means that while hospital staff will 
comply with the directives, they will do so with some difficulty, in a way that creates new 
problems in other areas.  Far better would have been to adopt a more consultative approach to 
developing new ways of working that satisfied the need to manage controlled drugs more 
effectively in a way that fitted with the operational needs of the people responsible for the 
procedures and practices.  This would have created an alignment between legal requirements 
and the day-to-day operation of the hospitals (Figure 1).   
 
Table 2 WA Health Department Approach 
 
 
Institutional Drivers 
Structure 
Institutional Drivers 
Agency 
Dimension 
and 
Components 
Coercive 
Forces 
Mimetic Forces Normative Forces Adaptation 
Employee 
Characteristics 
Elements 
within 
Components 
− Anti-
corruption 
agency 
− Regulation 
and 
Legislation 
− Risk 
management 
− External 
Audit 
 
− None present − None present − None adopted − Not considered 
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Table 2 Continued 
 
Organisational 
Reactions Outcomes External Impacts  
Conformity vs 
Differentiation 
Organisational 
environment 
Systems and 
processes People  
− No impact 
 
Capacity Building 
− Compliance 
− Convergence 
 
− Little change − Additional 
controls 
− New 
instructions 
and reporting 
system 
implemented 
 
− Increased 
work load 
for nursing 
staff 
Misconduct resistance 
established through 
compliance (See Figure 
1). 
 
 
Conclusion 
While this research is limited to the extent that it focuses on one jurisdiction, it does make 
theoretical and practical contributions.  For theory there are three main contributions.  Firstly, 
this study clarifies misconduct resistance by developing a framework for understanding based 
on institutional theory.  Secondly, the typology of how misconduct resistance varies between 
organisations is established that provides a way of assessing the degree to which it is likely to 
have sustained effects.  Thirdly, existing research into misconduct resistance is synthesised 
with institutional theory to formulate an integrative framework for researching and assessing 
how organisations are addressing misconduct resistance.  The usefulness of this framework is 
demonstrated by applying it to a study of controlled drug management in a public health 
service context. 
 
This study also has relevance to practice.  For health care policy makers and managers, this 
study demonstrates the usefulness of the typology and integrative framework for assessing 
the effectiveness efforts to improve misconduct resistance.  In applying the framework in this 
study it seems that to be successful, managers cannot simply rely on directives to combat 
misconduct.  It appears that in addressing misconduct resistance, attention needs to be paid to 
taking lessons from other jurisdictions in how institutional and agency factors have been 
taken into account.  For example, from an institutional perspective, information and 
communications technology can be used to monitor how controlled drugs are managed.  This 
will ensure that a combination of external controls in the form of audit assessment, risk 
management, transparency, and accountability combine to enabling misconduct resistance 
(Vian, 2007).  From an agency perspective, consultation with staff and accounting for 
contextual factors would probably be useful. This will help to make misconduct resistance 
personally relevant to those it affects (Warburton, 2001).  This study suggests that without 
the additional development of behavioural norms, applying lessons learned in other 
jurisdictions, and allowing some ‘bottom-up’ development of procedures and practices, the 
development of misconduct resistance will be at best based on compliance alone.  We hope 
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that this study assists further research that builds on the strengths and addresses the 
weaknesses of the framework presented. 
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